Location
Please select your investor type by clicking on a box:
We are unable to market if your country is not listed.
You may only access the public pages of our website.
Key points
Since last Friday’s payrolls report in the US, shorter dated Treasury yields have been supported on prospects for Fed easing. Arguably, if Fed officials had had sight of the soft jobs numbers over the past three months, then this could have merited a decision to cut rates at the July FOMC.
The three-month moving average of payrolls growth now averages only 35,000 jobs. This compares to 82,000 last September, when the FOMC judged that an abrupt slowing in the labour market justified a 50bp easing. However, it should be noted that the unemployment rate had been on a rising trajectory at that time, compared to a stable rate at 4.2% today.
In light of this, markets discount a 25bp cut at the next Fed meeting, though it seems that the market will be much more sensitive to signs of more broad-based slowing in activity, should this start to show up in more data releases, in the coming several weeks.
With futures markets pricing between two and three cuts between now and the end of the year, this pricing appears reasonable to us. However, risks are probably skewed towards more, not less policy easing, should inflation data prove more benign than economists have been predicting in the wake of tariff passthroughs.
It remains uncertain whether the bulk of the burden from tariffs will ultimately fall on US consumers, or whether it is exporting companies, who will absorb the bulk of the hit, through margins and earnings. This uncertainty lies at the heart of the Powell’s desire to wait and see, when it comes to adjusting interest rates.
Yet, the weaker jobs numbers means that the number of voices dissenting to Powell, is set to grow. At a time when the Fed finds itself under considerable political pressure, there will be an understandable desire to circle the wagons and agree a more unified position, come the September FOMC.
The upcoming Jackson Hole meetings at the end of this month may thus offer an opportunity for Powell to nod towards monetary easing, as long as next week’s CPI report does not show a nasty acceleration in prices.
All this said, we don’t think that there is too much to fear in the US economic outlook at the current time. We have flagged a slowing in the pace of activity below 2% in the second half of 2025, though deregulation, in addition to policy easing, could point towards a more upbeat outlook for the US economy as we move through 2026.
In assessing recent corporate earnings, we continue to be struck by the brisk pace of US investment in technology, driven by AI, which remains an underlying driver of growth and future productivity, and subsequently would be wary of turning too negative on the US outlook or a continuation of growth exceptionalism.
The case for more material US rate cuts through 2026 rests more on a perceived dovish pivot in US monetary policy, under a new Fed Chair. Yesterday’s appointment of Stephen Miran to the Federal Reserve Board on an interim basis may demonstrate the intent within the Administration to challenge thinking within the Fed.
As someone who has been sceptical of any inflation passthrough from tariffs, he might be expected to argue for sizeable cuts in interest rates and although he will only be one voice at the table, it is likely that he will be forthright with his views and offer a foreshadow of the direction the Fed may move in 2026.
From a bond market perspective, we continue to favour a 2/30 yield curve steepening stance. More broadly speaking, it may seem that 10-year yields remain in a trading range for the time being and there is not such a strong case to express a directional view with respect to 10-year bonds in the US, or in the Eurozone, for that matter.
With Europe in the midst of holiday season, Switzerland has found itself the centre of unwanted attention, with the country subject to the highest US tariffs of any developed market nation, at 39%.
In the past week, Swiss president, Karin Keller-Sutter travelled to Washington in an attempt to renegotiate this outcome, but left having failed to make progress on an improved deal. This news has weighed on Swiss assets, with the franc also weaker.
However, the greater significance relating to the stance on Switzerland could portend towards what can be expected with respect to upcoming tariffs, on the pharmaceutical sector. In this context, Trump has floated the idea of an initial tariff of 25-50% on pharma imports, with this potentially rising to 150% or more over the next 18 months.
We think an announcement of a section 232 tariff is probably due in the next couple of weeks and this could be the driver of some market volatility, in an otherwise quiet month.
Meanwhile, the spotlight in Europe has been back on the UK, with the BOE cutting rates to 4.0% and holding out the prospect of further reductions in the quarters to come. Notwithstanding core inflation at 3.7% remaining well above the Bank of England inflation target, Bailey and colleagues appear confident that price growth should moderate as the jobs market stalls and wage growth slows.
BOE models rely on a growing output gap to bring inflation down. However, a de-anchoring of price expectations means that workers continue to show appetite to strike for higher wages, as real incomes lag behind individuals’ true experience of higher prices.
In this context, we think that a dovish BOE may continue to lower short-term rates but do little to benefit longer dated borrowing costs. This means that Rachel Reeves may be pushed to raise taxes quite materially at the next Budget in order to adhere to the OBRs fiscal rules.
Yet, pretty much every tax rise that the Labour government has implemented to date seems to have made the deficit worse, not better. Attacking non-doms has seen a flight of wealthy individuals quit the UK.
Taxing public schools has meant that schools are shutting, and putting more of a strain on the state sector. Meanwhile, an increase in NI taxes has led to a reduction in employment and an increase in inflation, as employers need to pass on increased payroll costs.
All this highlights underlying vulnerability within the UK economy and government finances, unless the benefits and welfare culture can be properly addressed. As a result, we retain a negative assessment with respect to UK assets at this time.
In FX, the softer US payrolls report has helped to reverse the recent trend towards a firmer US dollar. Hedge fund and CTA positions in USD shorts appear to have been trimmed between 30-50% in size, as the dollar strengthened in July.
With renewed focus back on Fed easing ahead, at a time when other central banks are on hold, there may be scope for these positions to rebuild. However, we are somewhat wary of chasing a weaker dollar.
On the basis that the US growth outlook in 2026 remains healthy, US equities and tech continue to outperform and fears around an irrational Trump upending US policy credibility have waned. Consequently, we continue to hold modest positions in Korean won and Norwegian krone longs, thinking that if short-term interest rates are the main driver in FX, then it may be better to exploit such moves in terms of yield curve trades instead.
Next week, the US CPI provides the principal focal point for macro investor attention. Consensus estimates are for a 0.3% gain in core prices over the month of July, taking the annual rate to 3.0%.
We think that the risks sit to the high side on this particular data print. However, if the consensus number is confirmed, we think this will add to calls that the Fed has room to cut rates and is wrong to worry too much about temporary inflation impacts that may result from one-off changes in prices linked to the imposition of tariffs.
In discussion with White House officials, they argue that there is a strong case to lower the Fed Funds rate by 100bp immediately on the basis that restrictive monetary policy is no longer justified, that the Fed is behind the curve and rates, and, at most, should be no higher than the neutral R* rate.
There are also calls from some in the administration to demand that the FOMC acknowledges that the decision to not cut rates in July was a mistake based on bad information. They go on to highlight that there should be a case for a 50bp cut in September, on this line of thinking.
There is an ongoing concern that the Fed may be relying on bad economic models and bad quality data. In that light, the firing of BLS chief, Erika McEntarfer, partly reflects a sense of frustration within the White House.
Additionally, this is fed by paranoia that elements of the establishment exhibit an anti-Trump bias. On this basis, Trump has been motivated to fire those who he judges are not delivering in their roles. This could create scope for volatility ahead.
With that in mind, it may seem that along with the Swiss, Jerome Powell also have plenty to be cheesed off about this summer.
Suscríbase ahora para recibir las últimas perspectivas económicas y de inversión de nuestros expertos directamente en su bandeja de correo.
Este documento es una comunicación de marketing y puede ser producido y emitido por las siguientes entidades: en el Espacio Económico Europeo (EEE), por BlueBay Funds Management Company S.A. (BBFM S.A.), sociedad regulada por la Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF). En Alemania, Italia, España y los Países Bajos, BBFM S. A opera con un pasaporte de sucursal con arreglo a lo dispuesto en la Directiva sobre organismos de inversión colectiva en valores mobiliarios (2009/65/CE) y la Directiva relativa a los gestores de fondos de inversión alternativos (2011/61/UE). En el Reino Unido por RBC Global Asset Management (UK) Limited (RBC GAM UK), sociedad autorizada y regulada por la Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) del Reino Unido, registrada ante la Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) de los Estados Unidos y miembro de la National Futures Association (NFA) autorizada por la Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) de los Estados Unidos. En Suiza, por BlueBay Asset Management AG, país en el que el Representante y Agente de pagos es BNP Paribas Securities Services, Paris, succursale de Zurich, Selnaustrasse 16, 8002 Zurich (Suiza). El lugar de ejecución es el domicilio social del Representante. Los órganos judiciales del domicilio social del representante suizo o el domicilio social o lugar de residencia del inversor tendrán la competencia para conocer las reclamaciones relacionadas con la oferta o publicidad de acciones en Suiza. El Folleto, los Documentos de datos fundamentales para el inversor (KIID), los documentos de datos fundamentales (KID) de los PRIIP (productos de inversión minorista vinculados y los productos de inversión basados en seguros), cuando proceda, la escritura de constitución y cualquier otro documento necesario, por ejemplo, los informes anuales y semestrales, pueden obtenerse de manera gratuita solicitándolos al Representante en Suiza. En Japón, por BlueBay Asset Management International Limited, sociedad registrada ante la Kanto Local Finance Bureau del Ministerio de Finanzas de Japón. En Asia, por RBC Global Asset Management (Asia) Limited, sociedad registrada ante la Comisión del Mercado de Valores y Futuros de Hong Kong. En Australia, RBC GAM UK se encuentra exenta del cumplimiento de la obligación de poseer una licencia de servicios financieros australiana en virtud de la Ley de sociedades (Corporations Act) para la prestación de servicios financieros, ya que está regulada por la FCA de acuerdo con la legislación del Reino Unido, que difiere de la australiana. En Canadá, por RBC Global Asset Management (incluido PH&N Institutional), sociedad regulada por cada una de las comisiones provinciales y territoriales del mercado de valores ante la que esté registrada. RBC GAM UK no se encuentra registrada en virtud de la legislación sobre valores negociables, sino que se acoge a la exención para operadores internacionales contemplada por la legislación provincial aplicable a esta materia, la cual permite a RBC GAM UK llevar a cabo determinadas actividades específicas como operador para los residentes canadienses que tengan la calificación de «cliente canadiense permitido» (Canadian permitted client), según la definición de dicho término en la legislación aplicable a valores negociables. En Estados Unidos, por RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.) Inc. («RBC GAM-US»), asesor de inversiones registrado ante la SEC. Las entidades señaladas anteriormente se denominan colectivamente «RBC BlueBay» en el presente documento. No debe interpretarse que las afiliaciones y los registros mencionados comportan un apoyo a RBC BlueBay ni tampoco su aprobación por parte de las respectivas autoridades competentes en materia de licencias o registros. No todos los productos, servicios e inversiones que se describen en el presente documento están disponibles en todas las jurisdicciones, y algunos de ellos solo lo están de forma limitada, debido a las exigencias jurídicas y normativas locales.
El documento va dirigido exclusivamente a «Clientes Profesionales» y «Contrapartes Elegibles» (como se define en la Directiva relativa a los mercados de instrumentos financieros [«MiFID»]); o en Suiza a los «Inversores Cualificados», tal y como se definen en el Artículo 10 de la Ley suiza de organismos de inversión colectiva y su ordenanza de aplicación; o en Estados Unidos a «Inversores Acreditados» (según la definición de la Ley de valores negociables [Securities Act] de 1933) o «Compradores Cualificados» (conforme a la definición de la Ley de sociedades de inversión [Investment Company Act] de 1940), según sea aplicable, y ninguna otra categoría de cliente debería basarse en él.
Salvo indicación en contrario, todos los datos proceden de RBC BlueBay. Según el leal saber y entender de RBC BlueBay, este documento es veraz y correcto en la fecha de su emisión. RBC BlueBay no otorga ninguna garantía ni realiza ninguna manifestación ni expresa ni tácita con respecto a la información incluida en este documento y excluye expresamente en este acto toda garantía de exactitud, integridad o adecuación a un fin concreto. Las opiniones y estimaciones están basadas en nuestro propio criterio y podrían cambiar sin previo aviso. RBC BlueBay no proporciona asesoramiento de inversión ni de ningún otro tipo. El contenido del presente documento no constituye asesoramiento alguno ni debe interpretarse como tal. El presente documento no constituye una oferta para vender, ni una solicitud de una oferta para comprar, ningún título o producto de inversión en ninguna jurisdicción. Esta información se ofrece únicamente a efectos informativos.
Queda prohibida toda reproducción, redistribución o transmisión directa o indirecta de este documento a cualquier otra persona, o su publicación, total o parcial, para cualquier fin y de cualquier modo, sin el previo consentimiento por escrito de RBC BlueBay. Copyright 2023 © RBC BlueBay. RBC Global Asset Management (RBC GAM) es la división de gestión de activos de Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) que incluye a RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.) Inc. (RBC GAMUS), RBC Global Asset Management Inc., RBC Global Asset Management (UK) Limited y RBC Global Asset Management (Asia) Limited, entidades mercantiles independientes, pero vinculadas. ® / Marca(s) registrada(s) de Royal Bank of Canada y BlueBay Asset Management (Services) Ltd. Utilizada(s) con autorización. BlueBay Funds Management Company S.A., con domicilio social en 4, Boulevard Royal L-2449 Luxemburgo, sociedad registrada en Luxemburgo con el número B88445. RBC Global Asset Management (UK) Limited, con domicilio social 100 Bishopsgate, London EC2N 4AA, sociedad registrada en Inglaterra y Gales con el número 03647343. Todos los derechos reservados