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Have you ever felt safer in a war zone than in a peace zone?
That was my unlikely conclusion last week after landing in Dubai, where the roads were busy, school enrolments were up, and the biggest complaint from my counterparts in neighbouring Abu Dhabi was the 20-hour mandatory AI training programme their employer had imposed on every staff member. In a world where much of the West appears paralysed by uncertainty, the Gulf appears to be busy adapting, despite growing liquidity pressures.
I visited the UAE and Oman against the backdrop of what most people on the ground describe as a "frozen conflict", and view as the base case for the next couple of years. It is not a comfortable status quo, but it is one that businesses and governments have learned to operate within. The speed at which the region has moved from shock to recalibration should not be underestimated --the expression "don't let a good crisis go to waste" has rarely felt more fitting.
The overarching theme from most meetings was resilience – not in the abstract way, but in concrete, multi-billion-dollar investment decisions. Take ADNOC, the UAE's national oil company. It has expedited the construction of a second overland oil pipeline that, once commissioned in 2027, will allow the UAE to export the majority of its crude production bypassing the Strait of Hormuz entirely. ADNOC is fortunate to have a bulletproof balance sheet with just the listed entity alone, ADNOC Murban, generating US$26bn in free cash flow against only US$5bn in debt. The production ramp-up to 5 million barrels per day has been deliberate, and the UAE’s decision to leave OPEC earlier this year was designed precisely for an environment where the country can maximise its cash flow generation when it needs it most.
Then there is TAQA, Abu Dhabi's national energy champion. With AED75bn earmarked for spending by 2030, and a target of doubling capacity to 150 gigawatts, the investment trajectory is now steeper and more domestically weighted than it was in the original plan. The conflict changed the calculus. There is now much greater focus on reinforcing resilience across the network – generation, transmission, distribution – alongside meeting surging AI-driven electricity demand. TAQA has also decided to put its original plan of retiring gas-fired plants on hold, given the need for more back-up capacity to reinforce resilience in light of the regional conflict.
Oman, meanwhile, has played its traditional role as the region's quiet balancer. Its three ports outside of Hormuz have become logistics arteries for the entire Gulf. Customs processing at Salalah has been streamlined from a week down to just hours. Transit traffic through Omani airports has surged, with 80% of passengers connecting onwards to Asia. The country expects a fiscal surplus of 5%, its gas projects are expanding production, and its debt reduction programme is largely complete. Like the region's best operators, Oman has taken the crisis as an opportunity to accelerate the diversification it was already pursuing.
Most investors in the region have the same question on their minds when it comes to the real estate sector: whether it is about to blow up. The short answer is: not yet, and perhaps not in the way many would expect.
The main difference between today and 2008 is regulation. In 2008, the real estate sector was closer to the Wild West. Developers were collecting pre-sale deposits into their personal accounts, with no oversight. Today, every dirham of customer money flows through escrow accounts, monitored by an external trustee and the regulator, who also has full visibility on collections, construction progress, and cash deployment. More importantly, under UAE payment plans it is customer deposits rather than bank borrowings that fund construction, with most developers receiving around 70% of the property value in prepayments from their customers via instalments before completion. Crucially, the market remains overwhelmingly a cash market. Up until August of this year, off-plan mortgages were essentially non-existent with 80% of buyers paying in cash at handover. Therefore, banks’ exposure to the sector is minimal with both commercial and residential real estate accounting for less than 10% of total loan books. However, the question is, how will the sector perform over the next year in the scenario of a frozen conflict?
So far this year developers have been quite resilient. At Aldar, Abu Dhabi's largest developer, following a drop in 2Q26 sales, primary sales in the third quarter were already above pre-conflict levels, with prices up 3-5% on a like-for-like basis. Default rates remain below 3%, and development revenue backlog of AED70bn covers the next three years. While Abu Dhabi volumes are marginally higher, Dubai's market has softened, with secondary transactions 5-15% below original prices, primarily on stock sold in the last twelve months.
The real test, in our view, will come in about twelve months, and the risk will be concentrated among the smaller, more leveraged developers – the tier twos who have been borrowing at a higher rate and growing at a fast pace, and whose margins are now being squeezed from both ends. Some issuers, where accounting irregularities compound a liquidity problem, are likely to be challenged, but the risk doesn’t appear systemic. So far, the government's philosophy is clear: projects will be completed, but developers are not entitled to a bailout. It is the projects and the banks that will be protected, not the corporate entity.
The contrast with the UAE and some of its smaller, more troubled neighbours is stark. Bahrain faces a different order of challenge. The US base has been emptied, supply chains are disrupted, and the Economic Development Board's support is limited to salary payments for Bahraini nationals – roughly 25% of the workforce.
What struck me during conversations with businesses operating in Bahrain was the frustration with policymakers' inability to move beyond the traditional approach. One business owner, who has been engaging with government officials for months to secure a working capital guarantee, described the dynamic as follows: "we need a workshop instead of coffee meetings – they need to open a computer more often." In other words, while the willingness on paper exists, the individuals’ capacity and ability to provide support via basic financial products – factoring facilities, credit guarantees, or fast-tracked logistics support – is lagging.
This is where the contrast with the UAE is so marked. In Abu Dhabi, quasi-sovereign entities have mandated 20 hours of AI training for every employee. Legal document review that used to take days is now done in minutes. Project finance analysis is being transformed. The competitive gap between those embracing technology and those still conducting business over coffee is widening rapidly.
Yet, paradoxically, this crisis could be precisely the catalyst Bahrain needs to adopt a different approach – one that prioritises supporting domestic businesses with proper financial tools, building institutional capacity, and moving towards a more self-reliant economic model. With debt-to-GDP above 130%, Bahrain has one of the highest debt burdens in emerging markets. This, combined with an unsustainable fiscal trajectory and poor disclosure, led to its single-B rating being put on negative outlook by Moody’s in April this year. As one interlocutor pointedly observed, the ideal fiscal solution for Bahrain would be to become another province of Saudi Arabia – while politically impossible, the sentiment captures the scale of the structural challenge.
If Bahrain's challenge is institutional capacity, Lebanon's is political will. But even here, there is a sliver of optimism. With Hezbollah materially weakened, the geopolitical landscape has shifted. A peace deal between Israel and its northern neighbour could become a reality if the political players steer the discourse in the right direction. In parallel to the evolution of the regional security architecture, authorities have the opportunity to re-engage with creditors and the IMF.
Lebanon has been in default since 2020. The currency has collapsed, the banking system is effectively insolvent, and the political class has shown no urgency to reform. But there are potential catalysts that Lebanon could benefit from. Syria's reconstruction effort, whenever it materialises, would channel significant activity through Lebanese ports and financial infrastructure, if it is fit for purpose at that stage. Lebanon has a window for engagement with creditors and other stakeholders that has been absent for years. The government could use this momentum to push the Financial Gap Law through parliament and impose a loss-sharing framework that would unlock a full-scale agreement with the IMF, while also engaging in good faith with creditors. BdL also plays a key role. They can either be an obstacle to Lebanon's transformation, or a facilitator of positive change - but they need to move beyond old ways of thinking. Most importantly, the cost of inaction is not static - indeed, it is compounding. With the financial gap growing larger, the humanitarian crisis can deepen again into social instability. The longer Lebanon waits, the less the world will adopt a sense of urgency. Without the attention of key sponsors, the country risks moving towards becoming a failed state.
During my trip to the Middle East, I was struck by the fact that the observations and takeaways I described above are not those of an isolated regional story. The Middle East is, in fact, a microcosm of a broader pattern that we are observing across the emerging markets universe this year – one where the countries that have done the hard work are being rewarded, while those that have not are showing their cracks. It is fair to say that, in a period of higher global geopolitical volatility and inflationary fears in core markets, the resilience of EM countries and their ability to absorb the external shocks is not an accident. Indeed, we have seen a host of EM countries, from Ecuador to Pakistan, that have, over the years, swallowed the difficult pills of implementing potentially unpopular orthodox fiscal and monetary policies and invested in building resilience, even in the face of extreme challenges. These credits are now benefitting from the buffers they have built both domestically and in the international arena. In aggregate, this creates a stronger EM landscape than ever before and, increasingly relevant in the current macro backdrop, a healthier fundamental profile than that presented by many countries considered to be advanced economies.
As I boarded my flight out of Dubai, it occurred to me that feeling safer in a war zone than in a peace zone is less of a paradox than it first appears. Safety, in the end, is not the absence of conflict – it is the presence of a plan. The countries and companies that have used this crisis to accelerate reform, build buffers, and invest in resilience are not just surviving; they are positioning themselves to lead. The same is true across the broader emerging markets landscape, where the countries that have swallowed the bitter medicine are now reaping the rewards of resilience. Meanwhile, those still relying on coffee meetings and gradualism risk discovering that the world has moved on without them. In the end, "don't let a good crisis go to waste" is not just a catchy expression – it is the defining investment thesis of this cycle.
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