The Index Trap

Kilian Niemarkt: Welcome, everyone, to today's Global Equity webinar. My name is Kilian Niemarkt, Senior Client Portfolio Manager here at the RBC Global Equity team in London. I'm joined today by Habib Subjally, Head of Global Equities. Welcome, Habib. How are you today?

Habib Subjally: Hi, Kilian. Thanks. Very well, very well. Thanks for hosting this.

Kilian: Thank you very much indeed as well. You know, Habib, to set the scene for this webinar, if we think about global equity markets a bit more holistically, I think we all on this call can agree here that the last couple of years have been really a fantastic place for global equity investors. The MSCI World, the index increased by over 20% in US dollar terms three consecutive years in a row. Now, that doesn't happen that often. You and I, Habib, we work together on the same team for just over five years now. You're a very experienced investor, over 30 years of stock-picking experience. Doing that since the early 1990s. I got to know you during that time as a really calm personality. However, more recently, I feel you are increasingly nervous about the overall market, but at the same time also incredibly excited. Walk us through your current thinking.

Habib: Thanks, Kilian. Yes, you're right. The last three years have been a great time in equity markets. Markets have gone up. Risk appetite is high. What's not to like? Maybe that says something about me that I'm just one of these paranoid people that maybe overthinks things a little bit. Yes, you're right. I have to say I am nervous. I'm nervous because while markets have done very well, they are highly concentrated because the drive for markets to go up has been driven by a very narrow set of stocks, driven by a very narrow set of themes. This leaves markets highly concentrated, not very diversified. That is an unhealthy state of affairs. That makes me uncomfortable and a bit jumpy. Maybe that's nervousness.

At the same time, I'm also very excited. I'm excited for active management because as markets have got more concentrated, they will inevitably diversify. When that happens, there are many overlooked companies, out of favour companies that are doing some great things, that are great wealth-creating businesses. Those are relatively cheap, unrewarded now. When that time comes, it will be a great opportunity for us as active managers, not just us, but other active managers also, to preserve capital for our investors and to generate wealth for our investors.

Kilian: Habib, I really like the point that you raised there. You described it as an unhealthy index composition. You're very right about that because we always think about the MSCI World as this broadly diversified 1,300 stocks index. In reality, the top 10 of this index account for almost one-third of the index. I think it's fair to assume that the index has really shifted over the last couple of years from being a diversified beta pure play of being a very narrow, concentrated bet on a certain narrative, on a certain theme, I feel.

Habib: Yes, that's right. This chart you put up, Kilian, really shows that. When we think of an index, we think of it, pardon the statistical language, we think of an index as beta 1 and alpha 0, because it owns every stock in the asset class, that no individual stock has any particular major impact on the overall index. What you're seeing here is the top 10 make up 29% of the index. This is unusual. Normally, it's 10% or under.

Kilian: That's right. This is for the MSCI World. We do see the same actually to a more extreme extent in the S&P 500, to your point, has been always remarkably constant, the top 10 of that particular index, around 20%. In recent years, it jumped to around 42%. What we've done here, and I think this is really interesting, we compared the index concentration to fundamental bottom-up active managers towards their allocation towards the top 10. It's quite striking. For the first time ever in history, the index has a higher allocation towards the top 10 than active managers. Passive allocation have essentially emerged to a higher active risk than actual active managers.

Let's just think for a minute. To further highlight the diversification failure of the index, we did an analysis of the effective membership of those indices. The bottom part of the index maybe has a weight of around 0.01%. It doesn't really matter if there's a great business and the stock price doubles or even if you have a tenbagger, as an index investor, you would not participate in it. Now, at the other hand, you have companies like Nvidia who have an allocation of 7.4% of the entire index weight, and in fact have the same weight than the smallest 100 stocks in the index. Therefore, if you would look how many stocks do I actually own as an S&P 500 investor, it comes down to just 46 stocks that matter.

Now, Habib, we as ourselves, high conviction, deep fundamental active managers, we own around 40 stocks. That's not so far off anymore from the actual index. Perhaps to bring it to life, in our portfolio, we own the stock AutoZone. Now, for those of you who are not familiar with the business, it's a brick-and-mortar retailer for the automotive aftermarket. On paper, a very boring company relative to all these fancy AI names, but in the index, it only has a weight of 0.02%. It doesn't really matter. In our portfolio, we allocate more than 2% to that particular business. Over the last five years, it has provided us with really wonderful returns. The stock is up 170%, even outperforming the likes of Tesla.

It really highlights the opportunity for active managers in this forgotten 554 stocks, which are great companies, but don't really matter, whereas the effective membership of the index is only 46 stocks.

Habib: I haven't seen anything like this before. The only time I've seen this level of concentration is in individual country markets. Nokia became a very big percentage of the Finnish market. Nortel became a very big percentage of the Canadian market. Vodafone was a huge percentage of the FTSE, over 10% of the FTSE, but we haven't seen this at a global level. This is relatively unusual, I would say.

Kilian: Indeed. Perhaps the sector contribution is the same story here, isn't it?

Habib: Yes. It's not only about concentration by stock. When you look at the composition by sector, again, the composition of the index has changed quite a lot. If you bought an index fund 10 years ago, what you bought then has transformed into something quite different today. The technology share of your index fund that you bought 10 years ago has now doubled from 18% to 36%, and the defensives component of that has fallen from 27% to 17%. You get a very different flavour of beta. Both are beta-1, by definition. The index fund you bought 10 years ago was beta-1 at the time. Today, it's still beta-1, but it's a very different flavour of beta. The beta is much higher today than it was when you compare it to what you would have bought 10 years ago.

Kilian: Then there's really a third component to it, which is the country allocation, I would probably say, which is, apart from the concentration on holding and industry basis, something to really bear in mind. We all know the MSCI World heavily skewed towards the United States. This is now completely detached from the true economic output that the US is actually having as a share of GDP of developed market economies, which is much closer to 50%. You're really having a jurisdictional overexposure and risk, especially, towards the United States here.

Habib: This is one of the reasons why people went global, because they want to diversify away country-specific risk. Look, the US was always a big part of the global benchmark, but now it's got bigger and bigger. The whole point is that now the global portfolio is a big bet on the US and is disproportionately impacted by US policy, whether that is US monetary policy, economic policy, foreign policy, tariff policy, and all of those policies. You get disproportionate impact from that. This is something that the whole point of going global was that if one central bank makes a policy error, whatever, it doesn't impact you that much. You diversify that away. That diversification now is significantly reduced.

Kilian: It's another component to it, actually, because if I think about the currency element of the equation, you're actually heavily exposed towards the US dollar. Over the last year, we did see the US dollar weakening quite significantly to some extent to what you just described, Habib, around political noise, geopolitical noise. I mentioned at the very beginning that equity returns have been spectacular. Yes, in the US dollar, not so much so in other currencies, including euros, some of the Nordic currencies, Swedish Krona, NOK, and sterling.

On some of those currencies, the return last year was only around 3% to 4%, very far away, actually, from this 20% headline returns in US dollar. This is something to really bear in mind. It's a big bet you're actually taking within the index on the US dollar. Now, obviously, we have established now markets are concentrated. We get that. The question is now, obviously, why is this concentration by stock such an issue?

Habib: I go back to the index. We said the index was beta-1 but alpha-0. What I mean by alpha-0, it is maximum diversification because it owns every single stock in the asset class. It diversifies away company-specific risk. If one company wins and another one loses, it doesn't really matter because you own them both. Something bad happens to one company, something good happens to another company, again, it doesn't really matter to you so much because you own them both.

Over time, you participate in the overall economic growth and wealth generation of all the companies in aggregate. There are some companies that are generating a lot of wealth, some companies that are destroying wealth, but net-net, more companies generate wealth than that is destroyed. That's what an index measures. That's why people want to invest in an index fund. This point about when we said that the top 10 companies were a disproportionately high percentage of the overall index means that those companies can have-- if something bad happens to them or if something good happens to them, that can have a big impact on the overall index level.

That is something that is not meant to happen. In this chart, we measure idiosyncratic risk, which is a measure of stock-specific risk. You can see that the idiosyncratic risk was fairly low, about 1% for MSCI World and about 1.5% for the S&P 500. Now, since about 2000, it has slowly been drifting up. Now, MSCI World has 2.5% stock-specific risk, which is enormous. That is equivalent to the stock-specific risk that many active managers would have in their portfolio. This goes to show how individual stocks can now have a big impact on an index.

Kilian: Indeed, they can have. I think there are many historic examples in time where those stocks had an impact. AOL is perhaps just one to mention. I suppose the stock you remember from your active time, Habib, during that particular point and period. It was the go-to play to get exposure towards the new economy, towards internet. It was, at some point, even part of the top 10 holdings. As technological change happened, they completely missed the switch from dial-up towards broadband. In the end, we saw wealth destruction of 97%. There are a lot of other examples we can think of, Habib. For instance, Nortel.

Habib: Oh, yes, absolutely. Look, this has been the history of the stock market, right? The history of corporates. We'll come to that in a little while when we talk about the corporate lifecycle, for sure. We also have to talk about valuation.

Kilian: Yes, indeed. This is quite interesting because if you do think or if you do read the FT, the Wall Street Journal, or whatever your financial publication of choice might be, you will read, "Valuations are rich, valuations are high." This is correct. In fact, valuations are not just high, they're at all-time high if you speak about the market cap weighted version of the index. Now, if you compare that to the equally weighted version of the index, it's an entirely different picture. The valuations are not just not at all-time high, in fact, the valuations are fair. They're around their 10-year historical average. What's even more interesting is that now the spread between the market cap weighted and the equally weighted version is one of the highest we've ever recorded.

The fact of the matter is that market cap weighted indices end pro-momentum and anti-value. Because of this bunching that we described earlier, you also have to be aware that you are taking increased factor risk because if valuations grow in market cap weighted indices, they get a larger share. Plus, you have the ETF crowd when the ETF is rebalancing that also pour into these now higher valued companies. This is a reinforcing feedback loop that is completely decoupling the market cap weighted version from the equally weighted version of the index.

Now, if we think a bit more about this debate, equally weighted versus market cap weighted, it's quite interesting if we look at the performance between those two indices because equally weighted actually spectacularly underperformed during the buildup of the dot-com bubble. However, delivered a tremendous outperformance after the dot-com bubble burst. If I think about the more younger generation of portfolio managers like myself, Habib, for investors like us, there are two circumstances that are true. First of all, markets only go up. Even if they go down during COVID or whenever, they recover very quickly within a couple of months. The second element is market cap weighting always wins.

My question for you is, do you actually believe that a circumstance that we have seen during the buildup of the dot-com bubble and the years afterward, could that happen again? Are we perhaps in such a scenario right now?

Habib: This is a really interesting question. I think this chart really sums it up. I really like this long-term picture because, look, in financial markets, we are worrying about what's happening minute by minute, day by day, quarter by quarter. When you sit back and you look at the long-term picture, right? This is the S&P 500 equal weight relative to the S&P 500 cap weight. The first observation I would make is that the long-term trend line is upward sloping. That suggests that equal weight outperforms cap weight over the long-term. What that is really saying in simple terms is that small caps tend to outperform large caps.

Now, this may seem counterintuitive right now, but over the long-term, this is true. We have almost 100 years of stock market data that many academics have analysed. Eugene Fama got his Nobel Prize in part for this work on the small cap effect. This is a well-established trend. The way I think about this is actually just in simple capitalism. Small companies find a new technology, execute on it amazingly well. They do amazingly well, grow their profits, grow their customers. They become hugely profitable, become large companies. This might take 20, 30, 40 years. They become very large companies.

Then large companies tend to attract political attention, regulatory attention. They attract new competitors. Smaller companies look at this big profit pool and say, "I want a piece of that." They find new ways of stealing some share and profits from them. Of course, large companies that have been large for a long time tend to become complacent, lazy. Then they fail, and smaller companies take their place. This is the great circle of life in the corporate world. The academics call it the corporate lifecycle. This is well-established. It has been going on since before stock markets were even invented. I think this continues. This is a natural trend of entrepreneurialism and capitalism.

There are periods where this gets suspended, where large companies continue to grow larger and larger. Maybe this is because we have an unusually good cohort of large companies. Perhaps that. Perhaps the regulators and antitrust authorities have been a bit too lenient on them for whatever reason. You go through these periods where large companies become larger and larger. Then over the long term, they do fail, and smaller companies come and take their place. Then normal service is resumed. We have been through this period now for the last four or five years. The last time we saw this was in the late 1990s. That didn't end well.

Now, I'm not saying that exactly the same thing is going to happen again, because that is a sample of one, and it's very easy to say history is just going to repeat itself. History doesn't repeat itself. As they say, history rhymes. If you were to ask me, what does this chart look like in 10 years' time, five years' time, I would say the line is in the top right-hand side rather than the bottom right-hand side. That corporate life cycle is a very natural, powerful gravitational pull.

Kilian: Habib, I really like your analogy about the corporate life cycle there because I'll give you another example here. I know you're a very experienced investor, but you probably haven't been around in the 19th century, where we essentially saw-
Habib: Definitely not. [laughs]

Kilian: Good. Where we essentially saw that major technological innovations actually have led to market concentrations before. Even before that, in the 18th century, you had the buildout of the canals, but they quickly became irrelevant after new technology was railroads. This was a cutting-edge technological innovation at the time and actually led to a concentration of two-thirds of the entire index or market capitalisation, the equity market at that particular point in time.

What's interesting about rail is railroads are still around. They're still a very important part of society. In fact, they're still one of the most efficient ways to transport goods and services from A to B, yet the market capitalisation weighting has shrunk from two-thirds to just 49 basis points. A big change here. Although the technology is still around, it really has transformed the way we travel and we transport goods.

Habib: You're right, Kilian. Don't forget, railroads displaced canals. Canals were the main form of transport before then. Then railroads came along. Then, of course, you had roads and trucks and automobiles. That brought the demise of railroads. Then, of course, car companies, whether it was Ford, General Motors, Volkswagen, Toyota, these were the largest companies in their countries. Some of the largest companies in the world. Look at where they are now. Most of them are, you would charitably describe them as value traps.

This is, again, the corporate life cycle at work. What it teaches you is not to fall in love with these companies. It's great new technology. They're great companies, but things change. Change is the only constant.

Kilian: I really like that. This is a very important point you raised there. Don't fall in love with these companies, business models, or technological innovations. We have established now markets are concentrated around holding, around sector, around geography. We also established that the idiosyncratic risk of the benchmark is increased, but we still have to answer the question why that is the case, apart from this obvious AI Hyperscaler Capex story.

Habib: Why this is the case is a complex problem. It could be, like I said, this is an unusually great cohort of companies. It could be because antitrust and other regulatory authorities are setting back and allowing these companies to continue. In part also, and also to your point about valuation, why are valuations got so high? So many people are sitting there scratching their heads and wondering why this concentration has happened.

I think the mistake that we make is that we, as professional investors, we think that everyone else thinks like us. That we sit and we study and analyse these companies, and we try and predict and do different scenarios of the future and what these businesses will look like in 5, 10, 15 years time, and we build our discounted cash flow models, and we agonise over the discount rate that we apply to that to see if these companies are overvalued or undervalued and how much growth they might have and so on.

We assume everyone else thinks the same way, but that is not the case. If you look at the data, long only investors like us make up only 6% of the order flow of the purchases and sales of shares on the US stock market. This is down from 11% 15 years ago. We're only 6% of setting prices. The big increase has been the retail investor. That is now 21% of US order flow.

Now, retail investors come in many shapes and sizes and forms. Many of them are very sensible, very conservative investors. Here, the big increase we've seen in the democratisation of share trading. Think of the meme stocks. Think of all the stock discussions on Reddit and on Twitter or X. Think of platforms like Robinhood. This is where people are buying stocks using leverage. They're investing in crypto. Equities is just another asset class for them. They will buy either direct equities. They will buy ETFs. Many times, they are now these double, triple-geared ETFs on narrow themes, sometimes on an individual stock.

They also invest in these complex options strategies. We've seen this explosion of single-day expiry options where you are essentially betting on what a stock is going to do in the next few hours before the close. You've seen a massive explosion in that trading. That gets followed by hedge funds who try and anticipate what retail investors are going to do. Of course, the high-frequency guys are trying to anticipate what they're trying to do. Then passive comes in to magnify that even further.

Now, none of these investors care about valuation. Some hedge funds might build DCFs, but most of them have a very short time horizon and are thinking about what the stock is going to do in the next few minutes, hours, days, weeks, perhaps months. This is a short time horizon. Everyone thinks that they can get out at the top. This is the difference. One thing to remember is that equities are volatile and leverage and volatility don't go well together over the long run.

Kilian: That's right. This is a fascinating topic because what you're describing there is that trading essentially evolved from being a transactional utility, the two of us exchanging shares of Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, whatever, towards a dopamine-driven experience. Your point towards the rise in option volumes is a very important one because last year, for the first time ever, option volumes actually surpassed the volumes of stocks, which is simply mind-blowing if you think about that. You saw an increase of 260% over the last 10 years.

It really has worked, and we have to acknowledge it, handsomely well on the way up. The question is, are investors prepared for the pain trade on the way down? Because the same mechanism you describe will work on the inverse as well. As soon as there's a technological change, we talked about that coming up for whatever reasons, and equity markets of those top 10 holdings began to fall. They were flashed on Robinhood as the biggest losers. They will be part of the Reddit army debate.

If those people actually use, this time, put options, and these trades get sold to the market maker, the market maker would actually have to short the actual stock, so creating non-fundamental selling pressure on those businesses, creating a feedback loop that can be quite violent and painful on the way down, actually. I can probably summarise it with, the only constant is change. We do see here on the next slide the top 10 that we spoke about a lot today over history. I think it's quite foolish to assume that 20 years forward from now on, the top 10 of today, some of the so-called Magnificent Seven, will still be in the top 10 of 20 years going forward. Perhaps one or two names, but the vast majority, certainly not.

Habib: Kilian, I love this slide because it really puts that corporate lifecycle into context. What you see is companies don't get into the top 10 for no reason. These are great businesses. They got there because they did something very right. They did amazing things with technology. They executed on it. They created a huge amount of value for their customers and their other stakeholders and for their shareholders. Don't get me wrong. These are great companies and these are the types of businesses we like to invest in.

When you look at them over time and you look at the top 10 at the peak of the dot-com bubble, this is March 2000. Only one company, Microsoft, has made it from the top 10 in 2000 to the top 10 at the end of 2025. That also, Microsoft, is remarkable and unusual because it had 14, 15 years in the doldrums until Satya Nadella came and turned it around. That is an amazing feat, what he did. That is highly unusual.

If you look at the others, and like I said, these are all great companies, they got there because they did something right. If you look at them, both AOL and Lucent don't exist anymore. GE, under Jack Welsh, was this great company. Serious people would say back then, and as a young portfolio manager, people would say, "Why do I need to own a mutual fund? I just invest in GE. It has everything. It has industrial assets. It has media assets. It has financial services assets. That's all I need to put into my 401K or my pension plan. That's great." GE is led by the greatest manager ever, Jack Welsh. GE almost went bust.

Today, there are three public companies that came out of GE. Also, so many of GE's businesses have had to be sold off to other owners so that GE could survive and get through its liquidity crisis. Also, look at some of the others. Intel and Citigroup needed government bailouts. Others like Cisco is around and IBM is still around. Some would say it's a value trap. Walmart has had to reinvent itself.

When I look at the companies today, these are, again, great companies. They've got here for a reason. Rather than just admire them and fall in love with them, we have to be somewhat paranoid and skeptical. What is crucial is that at 2000-- I know when you look at the top 10, this isn't just the dot-com stocks, there were many others further down in the index. If you take this as a proxy that 27% of the index were made up of the dot-com. As that deflated, the other 73% had a lot of heavy lifting to do. This is what worries me today.

Today, the top 10 are made up of some great companies. They make up 41% now of the S&P 500. They could stay great for a few months, years, who knows? We know the forces of gravity are against them. This is something where we have to be skeptical. The index, of course, just continues to hold them indefinitely.

Kilian: That is a very important reminder. I think there are some echoes of 1999 that we can hear here because that was obviously a period where we saw some really spectacular IPO and M&A deals coming along, often of these unprofitable companies with the eye-watering valuations. There is, for instance, AOL and Time Warner. At that particular point in time, it was the largest deal ever being struck. In 2000, it was worth $320 billion. Again, in 2000, a ginormous market cap. That company has spectacularly fallen. It was a 97% wealth destruction with those businesses.

What's very funny is how history starts to repeating itself because right now, Warner Brothers, again, was in this big M&A proxy battle between Paramount and Netflix. Now, Paramount won. Kudos to them. They paid also a very large price for them at a time where the narrative is shifting towards AI being essentially a threat to Hollywood. You see these videos and scenes that you can create on your phone that essentially are almost the quality like professionally shot movie films. There's actually a question, is that asset that Paramount acquired worth so much? Is that something for a portfolio, you reckon?

Habib: Kilian, this is the thing that egos are high, confidence is high. You're right. It was similar in 1999. Now, with these kind of transactions-- things change and disruption happens. AOL failed to make the move from dial-up to broadband. Same thing about Warner Brothers. Warner Brothers has some great assets, right? HBO, some amazing content, some amazing filmmakers. With AI, there are some risks there. When someone pays a very full price, assuming that the future is not just the same as the past, but the future is going to be better than the past, that may not be the case. I think AI raises some question marks around that business model. This, I think, is why investors have to be skeptical.

Now, admittedly, in this amazing bull market of the last three years, you have not been paid to be skeptical. That skepticism has not been rewarded because everyone thinks they can get out in time. We'll have to wait and see.

Kilian: Speaking of skepticism, we have a big IPO coming up. First of all, the merger between SpaceX and xAI, biggest M&A in history by now. They're eyeing an IPO for later this year, valuation definitely above one trillion US dollar. That's something for our portfolio, Habib?

Habib: Well, we haven't done the work on it. Let's see. It'll be interesting to see that roadshow. It'll be very interesting to see if the founder comes around and visits investors all around the world. We'll see what he has to say.

Kilian: We will definitely host a webinar around that if the founder comes around, that's for sure.

Habib: For sure. [laughs]

Kilian: Another thought and reflection of the 1990s, and I think this is just worth reminding investors about, because what we do see here is the S&P 500 after the dot-com bubble burst in March 2000, the index took seven and a half years to recover it. Only recovered in summer 2007, and we all know what happened in autumn this year, just to be hit again by the great financial crisis. I suppose, Habib, that must have been a rather tough time for you to invest and live through.

Habib: I learned a lot through that period.

Kilian: I bet.

Habib: It was a great period to learn, for sure. Kilian, look, I don't want to get too bearish, let's be honest about it, but this is a history lesson. When you get a highly concentrated market, and then it starts to diversify because you get this generational change in companies. When those companies at the top are highly valued and then they derate, it takes time. In this case, let's use that proxy of the top 10. As the 27% that made up the top 10 back then, as they derate, it takes the remaining 73%, in this case, it took seven and a half years to get back to the level that we saw before.

Now, we have arguably markets that are even more concentrated. Like I said, I'm not saying it's going to happen the same way. It could be a slow, steady deflation. We don't know. We have to see how this happens. We could be early in the process. It's not necessarily today we're sitting at 1999. We could be sitting at 1997, and we could have still a couple of big years ahead of us. We don't know that. What we do know is when markets go from concentrated to diversified, it creates a big headwind for the index.

If you are using the index as your measure for the stock market, right now, it is highly concentrated and has a lot of company-specific risk, country risk, sector risk embedded in it and is not as diversified as perhaps most people think it is.

Kilian: Indeed. I would probably say this is the opportunity for us as active managers to capitalise from this dislocation. Looking back one more time, and I promise you, for the last time today, in history, what we've done here is we looked at all the fundamental US active large-cap fund managers during that time of the buildup of the dot-com bubble and the period that follows. You can really see that active management, and we see the rolling one-year excess returns, really struggled to outperform during the buildup because a lot of portfolio managers simply couldn't justify this eye-watering valuation that we saw before. AOL, Time Warner, Vodafone perhaps.

When the bubble deflated, you can really see this big recovery in excess returns. Actually, fairly consistent. Active managers did really well during that period. I think this is an important reminder as well.

Habib: Just to sum up, look, you asked me at the start why I was nervous. Well, I'm nervous because of the concentration and just the mechanism of how we go from a concentrated market to a more diversified market. I'm excited at the opportunity for active management to diverge from the index and to invest in these unloved great businesses that today are trading at very attractive valuations.

The key for us is to maintain diversification. We have to be humble. We don't know when this is going to happen or the trajectory with which it's going to happen, but we have to maintain diversification and maintain that discipline, that valuation discipline throughout.

Kilian: I'm going to conclude with a quote from the great Benjamin Graham who said, "In the short term, the market is a voting machine, but in the long run, it's a weighing machine." What we do see right now is that the voting machine is in full swing about opinions, faith, belief around the latest AI narrative. Over the long run, the weighing machine will answer the question, does that price that we're seeing right now actually is justified by the valuation? With that, let me thank you so much, Habib, for joining us today. Thank you so much to all of you as well for joining us.